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INTRODUCTION

The most notable developments in criminal law in 1973' in1. The present survey encompasses cases published in the National Reporter System
during the calendar year 1973. It therefore includes some cases decided in 1972 and does
not include other cases decided during 1973 but not yet reported. Some of the latter cases
have appeared in abbreviated form in the CRIMINAL LAw REPORTER, and reference to some
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volved substantive offenses. Both federal and state cases raised
important questions regarding sodomy.' Criminal abortion statutes were by-and-large rendered unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade3
and Doe v. Bolton,' and new legislation was enacted to replace
the Tennessee statute.- The long-pending series of obscenity cases
was also finally decided.1
Procedurally, significant decisions were rendered by the Supreme Court relative to consent searches7 and vehicle searches.,
The right of appointed counsel in all cases where incarceration
results was afforded retroactive application.'
II.
A.

OFFENSES

Against Person
1.

Homicide

A conviction of first degree murder in Tennessee may rest
upon any one of four theories: poison, lying in wait, the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any of six designated felonies,
and any other killing shown to be malicious, willful, deliberate
and premeditated."' If one of the first three theories is alleged,
proof of the act described is sufficient; it is not necessary that the
prosecution prove wjllfulness, deliberation and premeditation."
Malice, however, must always be shown. 2 In Stricklin v. State,"'
of these reports will be made in the footnotes.
Frequent references will be found to previous surveys in this series. The complete
citations are as follows: 1.968 Survey, 36 TENN. L. REv. 221 (1969); 1969 Survey, 37 TENN.
L. Rv. 433 (1970); 1970 Survey, 38 TENN. L. REV. 182 (1971); 1971 Survey, 39 TENN. L.
REv. 247 (1972); 1972 Survey, 40 TENN. L. REv. 569 (1973).
2. See pp. 206-13 infra.
3.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

4. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5. See pp. 217-19 infra.
6. See pp. 219-21 in/ra.
7. See pp. 229-30 infra.
8. See pp. 230-31 infra.
9. See pp. 237-38 infra.
10. TENN. COnE ANN. § 39-402 (Supp. 1973).
11. It may be conceded that, in most cases such additional proof would not be
particularly onerous for the prosecution. For example, the very act of "lying in wait" to
kill an individual would strongly suggest the presence of all four mental elements. Under
the felony murder theory, the proof of the mens rea required for the underlying felony will
frequently be equally effective to prove the mens rea required for first degree murder, with
the possible exception of premeditation.
12. TENN. COnE ANN. § 39-2401 (1955). See 1969 Survey at 436-40.
13. 497 S.W.2d 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
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the court of criminal appeals found first degree murder proved by
uncontradicted evidence that a lethal dose of arsenic had been
orally ingested by the decedent and a lack of any evidence of
accidental ingestion. In Buchanan v. State, 4 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a jury verdict, "We the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the perpetration of a robbery," was sufficient; it was not necessary that the jury include the phrase "murder in the first degree."
The use of a deadly weapon raises a strong presumption of
malice, as in Gunn v. State,'5 where the assailants struck the
deceased with two-by-two and two-by-four pieces of wood,"9 and
in Brooks v. State,7 where defendant slashed the throat of the
victim with a straight razor.
Homicide committed in the heat of passion in response to
adequate provocation is reduced to voluntary manslaughter. Two
of the traditional categories of adequate provocation were present
in Wright v. State" where death resulted from mutual combat
involving the deceased and the paramour of his wife. However,
the fact that the accused is in a highly emotional state at the time
of the killing is insufficient in itself to reduce the crime to manslaughter. It must be shown that the reaction satisfies an objective, reasonable man standard."' Thus, in Shanklin v. State," the
fact that the defendant was genuinely angered by the suggestion
of a patron in a barber shop that he go home, whereupon he shot
the patron, was insufficient to reduce the crime to anything less
than second degree murder."'
2.

Crime Against Nature

In Wainwright v. Stone,2 the United States Supreme Court
14. 488 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. 1973).
15. 487 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
16. For a decision concerning the use of a "deadly weapon" in Tennessee, see 1969
Survey at 223-25.
17. 489 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
18. 497 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
19. See 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 276, at 585
(1957). Ihereinafter cited as WHARTONI.
20. 491 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
21. "In our considered view the facts of this case do not overcome the presumption
in law that the killing in this case was anything other than second degree murder resulting
from anger engendered by slight provocation before the unjustified emotion could subside." Id. at 99.
22.

414 U.S. 21 (1973).
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was called upon to review the holding of a federal court2 that the
Florida crime against nature statute was void for vagueness. The
critical portions of the Florida statute 4 were substantially similar
to the present Tennessee statute.2 5 The case was complicated by
the fact that subsequent to the conviction of the petitioners, the
Florida Supreme Court, in Franklin v. State,2 ' had declared the
statute void for vagueness. The court in Franklin, however, limited its opinion to prospective application, 27 and subsequently
2
relief was denied to the present appellees.
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the federal district
court found the statute void for vagueness and ordered the release
of the prisoner. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed,
quoting extensively from the Franklin decision which had nullified the statute. Rather than interpret the federal district court
decision as compelling the state court to give its own decision
retroactive application, the court of appeals reasoned that the
lower federal court had independently determined that the statute was void for vagueness, and thus it afforded the appellees the
benefit of that finding. 29 The court of appeals observed:
[Tihe instant case is little more than a situation where
persons are currently confined pursuant to convictions obtained
under a statute that has been determined by the federal court
to have been void at the time petitioners performed the acts said
to have violated it. Cast in those terms there can be little question that relief was surely appropriate.3 "
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the holding of the
23. Stone v. Wainwright, 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973).
24. "Whoever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either
with mankind or with beast, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not
exceeding twenty years." FI.A. STAT. ANN. § 800.01 (1969).
25. TENN. ConE ANN. § 39-707 (1955) provides: "Crimes against nature either with
mankind or any beast, are punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than
five (5) years nor more than fifteen (15) years."
26. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
27. The only explanation for this result was "in view of our former decisions." Id.
at 24.
28. Stone v. State, 264 So. 2d 81 (Fla. App. 1972).
29. "The District Court did not order relief because petitioners were held under a
statute that was voided by the Florida courts; rather, the court below ordered petitioner
released because they were being held in physical custody pursuant to convictions of
violating a statute that the federal court found to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment." Stone v. Wainwright, 478 F.2d 390, 395-96 (5th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 396.
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court of appeals incorrect and reversed. The Court reasoned that
"when appellees committed the acts with which they were
charged, they were on clear notice that their conduct was criminal
under the statute as then construed."" The fact that the statute
was later declared unconstitutional by the state court was
immaterial.
The decision is at best a perplexing one. If the statute is in
fact void for vagueness, then why should not the determination
of the Florida Supreme Court be afforded retroactive effect? Conversely, if the prior decisions of the Florida court had afforded the
statutory language adequate specificity, then why did it abruptly
become constitutionally void for vagueness when the Franklin
case reached the Florida court? If the facts in Franklin:2 fell
within the definition given the crime in prior decisions, then the
defendant in that case was no more entitled to relief than the
present petitioner. If the conduct fell without those parameters,
then the conviction could be reversed for that reason, without
invalidating the statute. In short, while the state court is certainly free to reconsider the question of constitutionality at anytime, to find the statute void and not afford retroactive effect to
that determination is nonsensical.
By placing its imprimatur on the several decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the propriety of non-retroactivity, citing in support
Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. :':'
There the Court had held that a finding that a railroad charged
an excessive rate to a shipper did not have to be given retroactive
application. Neither the Sunburst case nor any of the cases cited
therein dealt with a criminal statute later declared constitutionally void. :" Indeed, while non-retroactivity in constitutionally
based decisions concerning criminal procedure is not uncommon, 3 1 the author has not found a single judicial decision, other
:11. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23 (1973).
:12. The case included consenting adults.
33. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
34. See also Schaefer, The Control of Sunbursts: Techniques of Prospective
herruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631 (1967). Justice Schaefer likewise does not consider this

possibility.
35. See e g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (self-incrimination and
failure to comply with statutory mandate); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971)
(limitation on search incident to arrest); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969)
(inadmissibility of evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping); DeStefano v. Woods,
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than the Stone case, in which a person convicted under a statute
declared void subsequent to his conduct, was not afforded the
3
benefit of the holding.
It may be argued, however, that the several holdings of the
Florida Supreme Court are immaterial to the present litigation,
and that the federal district court's determination of unconstitutionality is wholly independent of the decision of the state court
on the same issue. Therefore, the Supreme Court should have
addressed only the substantive question underlying the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. Conceivably, this is all it did, but
nevertheless, its sole reason for sustaining the statute against a
charge of vagueness is the interpretation by the state court. Yet,
in the Franklin case, the state court implicitly conceded that its
prior interpretations were insufficient to save the statute. The
state court's explanation for its change of course was murky at
best:
We have over a long period of time upheld the statute despite earlier constitutional challenges. We are persuaded that
these holdings and this statute require our reconsideration. One
reason which makes this apparent is the transition of language
over the span of the past 100 years of this law's existence. The
change and upheaval of modern times are of drastic proportions.
People's understandings of subjects, expressions and experiences are different than they were even a decade ago. The fact
of these changes in the land must be taken into account and
appraised. Their effect and the reasonable reaction and understanding of people today relate to statutory language ...
A further reason dictating our reexamination here is the
expansion of constitutional rulings on the invasion of private
rights by state intrusion which must be taken into account
in
37
the consideration of this statute's continuing validity.
If this was all true in 1971, is it credible that it was not equally
true one year earlier when the present appellee first appealed his
conviction? Indeed, if we are concerned with the evolution of
392 U.S. 631 (1968) (jury trial for serious contempts); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965) (inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence in state proceedings).
36. Cases are collected in Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966). All cases cited involve a
later ruling expanding statutory coverage or overruling a previous finding of unconstitutionality. Retroactivity was consistently denied because of the ex post facto effect of
making conduct criminal which was not so at the time it occurred.
37. Franklin v. State. 257 So. 2d 21. 23 (Fla. 1971).
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linguistic usage over the past century, is it not reasonable to
afford all persons presently incarcerated for violating the statute
the benefit of the contemporary realization of the vagueness of
the language?
The only defensible interpretation for the result reached by
the Supreme Court would be to assume that the Court independently determined to its own satisfaction that the interpretation
of the statute to render copulation per os and per anum criminal
obviates the problem of vagueness. It would further be saying
implicitly that the Franklin decision, declaring the statute void
for vagueness, was wrong, or, at least, a result not compelled by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The proper interpretation of the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Stone is pertinent to two recent Tennessee decisions. In
Stephens v. State,3" the court of criminal appeals held that
''crime against nature" was equivalent to the common law offense
of sodomy, which in its broadest sense "includes all acts of unnatural copulation." ' " So understood, the court concluded that the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court reasoned:
There is no danger that some kind of sexual perversion
apart from unnatural carnal copulation, unnatural sexual intercourse, could be embraced in the definition and description as
plaintiff in error contends."

These words ring hollow in light of the later holding in Locke
v. State" that cunnilingus is a crime against nature within the
statute. 2 While Locke involved a forcible assault, force or want
of consent are not elements of a crime against nature, and the
holding clearly is not based on this fact. 3 To support its dubious
38. 489 S.W.2d 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
39. Id. at 543.
40. Id.
41. 501 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
42. This decision was not reported until January 1974, but has been included in this
survey because of its obvious relevance to the other cases herein discussed.
43. The court conceded that the statute so interpreted might be unenforceable under
certain circumstances: "We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of the application of this statute to the private acts of married couples, a question inapplicable to the
facts of this case, and not briefed herein. Nor does the case sub judice involve the application of the statute to consenting adults." 501 S.W.2d at 828.
See also United States v. Brewster, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973). "The broad
'victimless' Pennsylvania sodomy statute involved in the instant case certainly cannot
even claim a purpose as weighty as that of the abortion statutes struck down as unconsti-
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pronouncement, the court turned to a single decision in Maine.44
Indeed, there was nowhere else to turn for favorable judicial authority in the last half century. There would appear to be but one
earlier decision supporting the result, a Georgia court of appeals
decision45 in which the majority was apparently too embarrassed
to write an opinion." In contrast, the Supreme Courts of Mississippi 7 and Washington" have refused to recognize such behavior
as constituting sodomy. Such is the "weight of authority" which
the court submitted "supports the view which we follow." For the
notion that its result is the "better reasoned," the court cited a
legal encyclopedia which would appear to say quite the opposite.
The broadest, yet quite legitimate, interpretation of the
Locke decision is that any contact between the sexual organ of
one person and any portion of the body of another, other than the
sexual organ of a member of the opposite sex, is a crime against
nature. '"' Yet, cunnilingus is a sufficiently common incident of
sexual conduct to be viewed as a "natural" form of behavior,
should the phrase "crime against nature" be approached as descriptive.5 Indeed, Judge Galbreath in dissent contended that the
tutional, where harm to the fetus was brought into question." Cf. State v. Lair, 62 N.J.
388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973). The sodomy statute is inapplicable to married adults, but
applicable to other consenting adults.
44. State v. Townsend, 145 Me. 384, 71 A.2d 517 (1950).
45. Comer v. State, 21 Ga. App. 306, 94 S.E.2d 314 (1917).
46. Not so, the dissenting opinion indicated: "Construing this statute strictly, as all
criminal statutes must be construed, I think it means that the carnal knowledge must be
by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner by man with woman." Id. at 307, 94
S.E. at 314.
47. State v. Hill, 179 Miss. 732, 176 So. 719 (1937).
48. State v. Olsen, 42 Wash. 2d 733, 258 P.2d 810 (1953).
49. "Other authorities, however, which seem to preponderate, and to be supported
by the better reasoning, hold that sodomy as used in connection with statutes prohibiting
the crime against nature includes all acts of unnatural carnal copulation with mankind
or beast, and that the crime of sodomy or the crime against nature is committed where
the act consists of penetration of the mouth. As stated by one court in construing the
statute on this subject, since no particular opening of the body into which penetration can
be made is specified, it follows that the actual penetration of the virile member into any
orifice of the human body except the vaginal opening of a female is sufficient for the
establishment of the crime in question." 48 AM. JUR. Sodomy § 2 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
This volume has now been replaced by 70 AM. JUR.2d Sodomy (1973). The above
passage is not to be found, and the most direct reference to the present question is the
following: "Oral copulation construed as sodomy . . .has included cunnilingus." Id. at
§ 6. Only one case is cited, in which the point is dictum, and the statute involved refers
specifically to contact by mouth.
50. This of course only speaks to the "mankind" portion of the statute.
51. More likely, the ultimate derivation is in Thomistic natural law. See T. AQUINAS,
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extension of the statute to encompass this conduct is unrealistic,
given the widespread acceptance of such behavior among consenting heterosexual adults." It may be suggested that any sexual
practice frequently engaged in by consenting adults is by that
fact "natural. 5 3 In this respect, concern may be engendered because of the socializing effect of court decisions. Given the concession of the court that its holding likely would be unenforceable,
at least against married consenting adults, the fact remains that
the court has said that in Tennessee individuals engaged in such
conduct are committing a felony punishable by imprisonment
from five to fifteen years, and although they may escape the pale
of the law in some instances because of independent constitutional impediments to prosecution, this in no way assuages the
moral and social condemnation of the statute as interpreted by
the court. If the justification of the criminal prohibition is solely
a moral one, there is a substantial question as to the propriety of
such legislation,5 4 particularly where the moral suasion codified
is not necessarily shared by a majority of those subject to the law.
The conduct involved in the Locke case would be criminal
under the Proposed Criminal Code because of the absence of
consent. 55 However, the same activity between consenting adults
would not be prohibited. Under the Proposed Code, the crime
against nature statute is replaced by a section captioned "sexual
abuse" which proscribes the occurrence of certain conduct "without the other person's consent."5 Other sections of the Proposed
Part II, Q. 94, Art. 3, Rep. Obj. 3.
52. "To hold that cunnilingus (an act approved by almost 90% of adults between
18 and 34 according to an exhaustive study) is a crime would seem to me to be judicial
legislation of the plainest kind." 501 S.W.2d at 828-29.
53. Cf. Connor v. State, 490 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark. 1973): "Whether it is called
sodomy, buggery, or crime against nature-as it often is called interchangeably-it boils
down to a simple definition that it is an unnatural sex act which is condemned. It is the
opposite of a natural sex act; the manner of a natural sex act is well known, even to the
young and uneducated." If, as Justice Stewart said of obscenity, sodomy cannot be particularly defined, but, "I know it when I see it," Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(concurring opinion), perhaps the courts are well advised to take judicial notice of public
attitudes toward sexual practices, including those of the young and uneducated.
54. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. TENN. CRIM. CODE AND CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 39-1304 (Proposed Final Draft,
Nov. 1973) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL CODE].
56. Id. § 39-1304 provides in part:
(b) The intercourse is without the other person's consent under one or
more of the following circumstances only:
SUMMA THEOLOGICA,

19741

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

Code concern sexual abuse of a child, '7, and public lewdness."
3.

Incest

A conviction for a felony in Tennessee cannot be based on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 9 This rule has particular significance in sodomy cases. The majority view would
appear to be that a child is incapable of consenting, and therefore
is a victim rather than an accomplice. 0 In Tennessee, however,
the burden falls on the prosecution to prove that the witnessparticipant, even if a child, " did not consent to the act, and
therefore should be considered a victim. "2
This stringent requirement of proof was recently recognized3
in two cases of purported incest with a child. In Henley v. State,
the court of criminal appeals held the testimony of the fifteenyear-old daughter of defendant insufficient to support a conviction. "4 A like result was reached on appeal in Ballew v. State 5
where defendant had been convicted of incest with his fourteen(1) the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by force
that overcomes such earnest resistance as might be reasonably expected
under the circumstances; or
(2) the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by any
threat that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution;
or
(3) the other person has not consented and the actor knows the other
person is unconscious or physically unable to resist; or
(4) the actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect the other
person is at the time of the deviant sexual intercourse incapable either
of appraising the nature of the act or of resisting it; or
(5) the other person has not consented and the actor knows the other
person is unaware that deviant sexual intercourse is occurring; or
(6) the actor knows that the other person submits or participates because of the erroneous belief that he is the other person's spouse; or
(7) the actor has intentionally impaired the other person's power to
appraise or control the other person's conduct by administering any substance without the other person's knowledge.
57. [d. § 39-1308.
58. Id. § 39-2641.
59. See cases cited in 1969 Survey at 457 n.136.
60. 3 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 647, at 356 (1973).
61. See, e.g., Boulton v. State, 214 Tenn. 94, 377 S.W.2d 936 (1964); Sherrill v.
State, 204 Tenn. 427, 321 S.W.2d 811 (1959).
62. Davis v. State, 442 S.W.2d 2&3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
63. 489 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
64. "The rule in this State requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice
has been applied in sex cases even where the accomplice is a child." Id. at 55.
65. 498 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
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year-old married daughter. While recognizing that the prosecution had proffered some evidence for the purpose of corroboration,
the court found it insufficient to the task.6 The Proposed Criminal Code does not include a corroboration requirement in the
definition of incest, 7 and the comment expressly recognizes and
approves the distinction drawn in Tennessee decisions between
victims and accomplices."
4.

Kidnapping

In McCracken v. State," the court of criminal appeals held
that asportation is an essential element of the crime of kidnapping"' in Tennessee. Examining the critical phrase, "confines,
inveigles or entices away," the court concluded that the final
term was "a common word with a well understood meaning,"'"
which modified the three preceding verbs. At common law asportation was an essential element of the crime of kidnapping, and
it continues to be so recognized in modern decisions. The element of asportation may be deemed appropriate to distinguish
the offense of kidnapping from false imprisonment, 74 but statutory modifications may, of course, provide a broader definition of
66. "In corroboration the state offered the testimony of two of Wanda's aunts and
her husband, Robert Dale McKinney, age 18. These aunts were infrequent visitors in the
home and testified that the defendant touched Wanda's breasts and legs two or three
times in their presence. One of these occasions occurred when Wanda was 11 or 12 years
old. The husband tells that the defendant put his hands on Wanda's legs when he visited
them. This testimony of these witnesses does not show acts of undue familiarity which
would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable man to believe in the existence of an
incestuous disposition between the parties involved and is too remote and insignificant
for corroboration of the accomplice. Demonstrations of affection must be considered by
the jury in the light of the kinship of the parties." Id. at 920.
67. CRIMINAL CODE § 39-1502.
68. "This judicial policy is deemed preferable to a blanket corroboration statute in
the incest area, which include both consensual and nonconsensual relationships. Nonconsensual relationships, of course, can be prosecuted as sexual offenses." Id. comment at
108.
69. 489 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
70. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2601 (1955).
71. "Itmay be more awkward to apply it to the word 'confines' than to 'inveigles'
and 'entices' but it fits in some cases and grammatically it is an adverb that modifies all
three verbs." 489 S.W.2d at 52.
72. 4 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 259 (1822); Note, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 540 (1953).
73. People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415 (1973); Aikerson v. State, 274
So. 2d 124 (Miss. 1973).
74. See 389 Mich. at 230, 205 N.W.2d at 419. False imprisonment is now a common
law offense in Tennessee. It is codified in the CRIMINAL CODE § 39-1202.
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kidnapping, and it would appear the language quoted above from
the Tennessee statute need not be confined to the common law
meaning. A recent Pennsylvania case7" construed the language,
"takes, or carries away, or decoys or entices away, or secretes a
person,"7 as not requiring "movement or change in position of
the person or object taken."" Even closer in point is an Oklahoma
decision 5 construing the phrase "confined or imprisoned"7 9 sufficient to sustain a kidnapping conviction without proof of
asportation.
In the present case, the court confessed to some awkwardness
when applying the adverb "away" to the verb "confines," but
nevertheless concluded that such a grammatical construction was
proper and necessitated a requirement of asportation. Even more
perplexing is the existence of a prior decision, Cowan v. State,so
cited by the court in the present case, which reached the opposite
result. In Cowan, two teen-age couples were parked in a field off
a secluded road. Defendant, who lived about a quarter of a mile
away, went to the automobile and threatened to use a pistol in
his possession if they attempted to leave. He demanded and was
given the ignition key to the automobile, and for the next seven
hours, he unsuccessfully made sexual advances to the two girls.
A conviction for kidnapping was affirmed. Ironically, the court
quoted the kidnapping statute insofar as pertinent here, as follows: "Any person who forcibly or unlawfully confines . . . another ...
."s Thus, the court avoided the problem of interpreting "away" by simply excluding it as not pertinent.2
Assuming that asportation is now required for a conviction
of kidnapping, what result is reached when B.B. Wolf "entices"
R.R. Hood to a woodland cottage by telephone, and once she
enters, slams the door and will not let her leave? Has there been
75.

Commonwealth v. Russell, 310 A.2d 296 (Pa. 1973).
PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4723 (1973).
77. 310 A.2d at 297.
78. Jenkins v. State, 508 P.2d 660 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
79. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 741 (1958).
80. 208 Tenn. 512, 347 S.W.2d 37 (1961).
81. Id. at 515, 347 S.W.2d at 39.
82. "There can be no question but that the great preponderance of the evidence in
this case establishes it as a fact that Cowan forcibly and unlawfully confined these two
couples at an isolated place during the night time for a period of seven hours for the
purpose of thereby coercing one or both of these girls to have sexual intercourse with him.
On principle the acts of this defendant fall within the meaning and intent of our kidnapping statute." Id. at 516, 347 S.W.2d at 39.
76.
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an asportation? Certainly there is not as that term is used elsewhere, such as in larceny cases where the asportation does not
begin until a "taking" has occurred. Yet the conduct would seem
the type for which the kidnapping statute was intended.
The Proposed Criminal Code would appear to eliminate this
ambiguity by clearly dispensing with the requirement of asportation. The relevant section provides that an individual "commits
kidnhpping if by force, threat, or fraud he intentionally or knowingly detains another, or intentionally or knowingly moves another from the vicinity where he is found. ....,,83
B.

Against Property
1.

Larceny

An essential element of the crime of larceny is a specific
intent to seal.s4 Circumstantial proof of this element arose in two
5 defendant was apprehended while
recent cases. In Hall v. State,"
breaking into a residence, To sustain a charge of burglary it was
necessary that the prosecution prove a specific intent to commit
larceny. The court concluded that "intent to steal may be inferred from the breaking and entering of a building which con''
tains things of value or from the attempt to do So. 81
7
Similarly, in Russell v. State, defendant was charged with
attempted larceny. The victim, a customer in a supermarket,
observed that her purse was open after she was bumped twice
by defendant. Nothing was removed from the purse, however. A
security officer had observed defendant bump into two other
women in a comparable fashion. The court concluded that there
was sufficient evidence of an intent to steal.
C.

Against Person and Property
1. Robbery

The crime of robbery is an "aggravated larceny," 8 and there83. CRIMINAL CODE § 39-1201. Identical language is used to define false imprisonment. Id. § 39-1202. The sections differ in respect to the intent which accompanies the
abduction.
84. See 2 WHARTON § 453, at 83.
85. 490 S.W.2d 495 (Tenn. 1973).
86. Id. at 496. See also Lee v. State, 489 S.W.2d 61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
87. 489 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
88. Crews v. State, 43 Tenn. 350, 353 (1866).
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fore all the elements of larceny must be proven to support a
conviction. Proof of a specific intent to steal has been a recurring
problem in Tennessee decisions. 9 In Young v. State, 0 defendant,
an inmate of the county jail, gained possession of a revolver and
escaped from the facility by threatening a deputy sheriff with the
weapon. He took a set of jail keys from the deputy, ordered him
into the cell, and locked the door. The keys were discarded in a
field adjoining the jail and not found for several months. Among
the charges brought against defendant was robbery in the taking
of the keys. The supreme court held that there was insufficient
proof of an intent to steal.
The decision is reminiscent of Black v. State,9 where in the
process of a brutal assault, defendant grabbed a toolbox held by
the victim. The toolbox was abandoned a short distance from the
assault. The court found a sufficient asportation for larceny, but,
over a vigorous dissent, declined to consider the question of the
presence of an intent to steal.92
The robbery statute 3 provides for a heavier punishment
'when a deadly weapon is employed. In Powell v. State,94 the court
of criminal appeals held that when a pistol is used with no reason
to believe the weapon is a toy or only designed to fire blanks, the
burden of proof falls upon the defendant to prove that it was not
a deadly weapon.95
D.

Public Offenses
1. Abortion

By its decision in Roe v. Wade,"6 the United States Supreme
Court rendered void prohibitory abortion statutes in the majority of states, including Tennessee. Resorting once more to a constitutional right of privacy,9" the Court concluded that that right
89. See 1971 Survey at 252-53; 1970 Survey at 190-91; 1969 Survey at 440-42.
90. 487 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1972).
91. 443 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn, Crim. App. 1969).
92. Discussed in 1969 Survey at 440-42.
93. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp. 1973).
94. 489 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
95. Even if the weapon is demonstrably incapable of firing bullets, it remains possible that it may be deemed a deadly weapon if usable as a bludgeon. See 1968 Survey at
223-25.
96. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
97. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy,"9 although "this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.""9 The compromising standard promulgated by the Court was: (1) during the first trimester, the decision
and method of termination of pregnancy is not within the regulatory powers of the state; (2) beyond the first trimester, "the State,
in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health";10 0 (3) subsequent to viability
(generally, the third trimester), the state may regulate and even
prohibit abortions, except where necessary for the preservation of
the life and health of the mother.
In a companion case, Doe v. Bolton,'"' the Court found unconstitutional Georgia statutes requiring that all abortions be
performed only in hospitals or accredited hospitals, that abortions be approved by a hospital committee, that two copractitioners concur in the decision to perform an abortion, and
that abortions only be available to residents of the state. The
Court, however, saw nothing unconstitutionally vague in a statute making it a crime for a physician to perform an abortion
except when it is "based upon his best clinical judgment that an
2
abortion is necessary.'1
Responsive to these decisions, the Tennessee legislature repealed the state abortion statutes ' and replaced them with a
series of provisions designed to be consistent with constitutional
mandates." 4 The act permits abortions in the first trimester
"with the pregnant woman's consent and pursuant to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." After
the first trimester, the abortion must be performed by the pregnant woman's attending physician in a hospital operated by the
state or federal government or licensed by the Department of
Public Health. After viability, an abortion is only permissible if
the attending physician certifies that the abortion is necessary to
98. 410 U.S. at 135.
99. Id.
100. Id.at 140.
101. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
102.
103.

104.

GA. CODE § 26-1202(a) (Supp. 1973).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-301-302 (1955).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301 (Supp. 1973).
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preserve the life or health of the mother. Finally, the act provides
that no abortion shall be performed unless the woman provides
satisfactory evidence that she is a bona fide resident of Tennessee, a provision which 0would
appear palpably unconstitutional
5
under the Doe holding.
2.

Obscenity

The United States Supreme Court concluded its most recent
term with a series of decisions on obscenity, the key decision
being Miller v. California,'°6 the first case since Roth v. United
States"'" in which a majority of the Court joined in an opinion on
the definition of obscenity. The Court proffered a three-pronged
standard for the determination of obscenity:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.""e
The Court expressly renounced the "utterly without redeeming
social value" test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts,09 which, it noted,
"has never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices
at one time.""" Confident in its belief that the standard proposed
would not seriously threaten first amendment values, the Court
observed:
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to
prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law,
as written or construed."'
105. The Court provided only a faint suggestion of a possible rationale for such a
restriction: "There is no intimation ... that Georgia facilities are utilized to capacity in
caring for Georgia residents." 410 U.S. at 179.
106. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

107.
108.
109.
110.

354
413
383
413

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

111.

Id. at 27.

476 (1957).
at 24.
413 (1966).
at 25.
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Nevertheless, substantial skepticism has been garnered by the
further determination that the "community standards" referred
to in the test are local as opposed to national standards. If this is
indicative of a readiness on the part of the Court to give absolute
deference to jury determinations of obscenity, assuming the proper test is articulated, then effectively there is no objective constitutional standard. Whatever may be the present inclination of
the Court, such a posture cannot endure in the face of substantially inhibitory determinations at local levels. ,,2 The solution will
most likely come in an objectification of the third prong of the
standard, a result which may be reached without substantial
damage to the holding in Miller.
Other dimensions of the obscenity problem were explored in
separate decisions. In ParisAdult TheaterIv. Slaton,"3 the Court
resolved that the privacy doctrine of Stanley v. Georgia"' could
not be extended to an "adult" theater exhibiting obscene films
to consenting adults."115 The Court further held that expert testimony would not be required to establish obscenity, ' thus promoting the impression of an unrestrained subjective standard. In
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film,"' 7 the
Court held that Congress could prohibit the importation of obscene materials, even when intended solely for personal use. Nor,
according to United States v. Orito,"5' is it impermissible to prohibit obscene materials from interstate commerce, irrespective of
the ultimate destination. In Kaplan v. United States,'"' the Court
held that textual materials could be found obscene under the
112. For example, the Court presently has pending a Georgia case in which the
motion picture Carnal Knowledge, a film which received an "R" rating by the industry,
was found obscene. Jenkins v. Georgia, 42 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1973).
113. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
114. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
115. "IT]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against
exposure to juveniles and to passersby. . . . These include the interest of the public in
the quality of life and the total community environment, the total of commerce in the
great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself." 413 U.S. at 57-58.
116. "This is not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of expert testimony.
Such testimony is usually admitted for the purpose of explaining to lay jurors what they
otherwise could not understand. . . . No such assistance is needed by jurors in obscenity
cases; indeed the 'expert witness' practices employed in these cases have often made a
mockery out of the otherwise sound concept of expert testimony." Id. at 56 n.6.
117. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
118. 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
119. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

19741

Miller test; it was unnecessary that the work contain any pictorial
representations.
The proper procedure for the seizure of a purportedly obscene
film was considered by the Court in Roaden v. Kentucky'2' and
Heller v. New York. 12' In the Roaden case, the sheriff and prosecutor observed a film at a drive-in theater, concluded that it was
obscene, and immediately arrested the manager of the theater
and seized the film. A conviction for exhibiting an obscene film
followed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that the film was illegally seized, absent prior udicial authorization. On the other hand, in the Heller case, a judge accompanied
a police officer to witness the commercial exhibition of a motion
picture. At the conclusion of the film, the judge immediately
signed warrants for the seizure of the film and for the arrest of
the manager, projectionist and ticket-taker. The Court sustained
the legality of the procedure, holding that an adversary proceeding prior to the seizure was not essential.'2 The critical fact was
that there had been a judicial determination of obscenity prior to
the seizure. The Court observed that there had been "no showing
that the seizure of a copy of the film precluded its continued
exhibition," ' nor had the petitioner objected to any delay in the
expeditious determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary
proceeding.
A recently enacted statute' 4 has declared operation of an
adult book or magazine store, adult motion picture house or adult
peep show house against public policy. The statute provides further that leases or rental contracts on real estate or buildings for
these purposes are likewise against public policy and not enforceable. 2
3.

Miscellaneous Statutes

Solicitation of a criminal offense, long recognized as a crime
120. 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
121. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
122. Cf. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
123. 413 U.S. at 490.
124. Ch. 184, § 1,119731 Tenn. Pub. Acts 207.
125. In Airways Theatre, Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), the
court held a state nuisance statute, [Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-301 et seq. (1973)], unconstitutional by virtue of language irreconcilable with the Stanley and Roaden decisions.
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at common law, has been made a statutory offense.' The statute
departs from the common law offense in specifying certain matters that will not constitute a defense: (1) that the solicitation was
unsuccessful; (2) that the person solicited could not be guilty of
the offense solicited; (3) that the person solicited was unaware of
the criminal nature of the conduct solicited; and (4) that the
person solicited was unable to commit the crime solicited because
of a lack of capacity, status, or characteristic needed to commit
the intended crime, if the solicitor was unaware of this fact. It is
a defense to the charge, however, "that the defendant, after soliciting another person to commit an offense, prevented the commission of the crime under circumstances manifesting a complete
1
and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. 127
New statutory provisions were enacted to prohibit the manufacture, importation, purchase, sale, disposition, or possession of
certain firearms, except as authorized; 2 8 to prohibit loitering on
school and church property;"'9 and to prohibit spying and peeping
in any dwelling or other building. 31° A unique innovation for the
apprehension of persons littering from motor vehicles was also
enacted. 3 ' The statute provides that any person witnessing littering from a motor vehicle "may record [sic] the date and time of
day of the littering and the license plate registration number and
state of registration to any state or local law enforcement authority."' 2 The license plate number is prima facie evidence that the
littering was done by the person to whom the vehicle is registered.
The witness is required to appear in any resulting prosecution.
Several constitutional arguments regarding the Tennessee
Drug Control Act 3 3 were considered in Fell v. Armour. 31 Citing
extensive authority, a federal district court sustained the provision of the Act permitting the warrantless seizure for purpose of
forfeiture of a conveyance believed to have been used in violation
of the Act. Nor was the court constitutionally offended 3' by the
126.
127.
128.

Ch. 62, § 1,[19731 Tenn. Pub. Acts 137.
Id.§ 2.
Ch. 67, 119731 Tenn. Pub. Acts.
129. TENN. COnE ANN. § 39-1211 (Supp. 1973).
130. Id.§ 39-1212.
1:31. Ch. 254, § 1,119731 Tenn. Pub. Acts 779.
132. Id.
133. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-1404-1448 (Supp. 1973).
134. 355 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
135. "Were it not for the historically peculiar nature of the law relevant to forfei-
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absence of notice and hearing prior to the seizure. However, the
process accorded the property owner after seizure was found inadequate in several respects. First, the Act failed to provide notice
to the party that the seizure had occurred, nor did it specify the
procedure for challenging the seizure.' 36 Thus, the court held:
[Tihe notice must necessarily state the reasons for the
seizure and the procedure by which he may seek recovery of his
vehicle, including the time periods in which he must present his
claim for recovery,
and the penalty for failure to file within the
:7
time period.''
Second, the Act improperly placed the burden on the property
owner to disprove that the vehicle had been used in violation of
the Act.1:1 The property owner could, however, be required to
prove that he came within any exemption or exception provided
in the Act. Finally, the cost bond provision of the Act was found
to deny due process to property owners unable to post the required bond."' The constitutionality of the provisions of the Act
relating to the possession of marijuana were sustained in Lee v.
State. 4,
III.
A.

DEFENSES

Entrapment

Tennessee courts have consistently held that entrapment is
no defense in this state,'"' a position reiterated in several recent
tures, the Court would be strongly inclined to apply the holdings and rationale of recent
United States Supreme Court due process cases as to notice and hearing prior to seizure."
Id. at 1326.
136. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S.
208 (1962).
137. 355 F. Supp. at 1329.
138. "ITihe State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle
was used in violation of the Act." Id. at 1331.
139. "As to these indigent owners, the effect of the $250 cost bond requirement is to
grant to the seizing police officer the effective right to extinguish all property interests.
As to those too poor to afford a hearing, this exercise of raw power can only lead to
arbitrary state action in that no neutral hearing officer or judicial official will have the
opportunity to review the evidence and determine the propriety of the forfeiture or the
claim for recovery. Thus, the indigent owner may be deprived of property without due
process of law in that the deprivation may occur without any process whatsoever." Id. at
1333.
140. 498 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
141. Warden v. State, 214 Tenn. 398, 381 S.W.2d 247 (1964); Roden v. State, 209
Tenn. 202, 352 S.W.2d 227 (1961).
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decisions.1 2 The continued acceptability of this rule was put to
the test in United States v. Russell,'4 " where the accused sought
to have the defense of entrapment elevated to a constitutional
protection within the due process clause. An undercover agent
had gone to the home of the defendant and offered to supply him
with a chemical essential to the manufacture of an illegal narcotic
in exchange for half of the drug produced. The defendant had
agreed, and sometime after the completion of the transaction he
had been arrested and ultimately convicted for the manufacture
of the narcotic. On appeal, defendant contended that the level of
involvement of the government agent "was so high that a criminal prosecution for the drug's manufacture violates the fundamental principles of due process."' 4 The Supreme Court declined
to accept the opportunity to establish a constitutional standard,
at least given the facts of this case. "I Nor was it prepared to
broaden the nonconstitutional standard for entrapment in federal
courts to encompass the conduct involved."'
142. Halquist v. State, 489 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Shadden v. State,
488 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
143. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
144. Id. at 430.
145. "While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of' law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v.
('olifornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. Shapiro's
contribution of propanone to the criminal enterprise already in process was scarcely objectionable. The chemical is by itself a harmless substance and its possession is legal. While
the government may have been seeking to make it more difficult for drug rings, such as
that of which respondent was a member, to obtain the chemical, the evidence described
above shows that it nonetheless was obtainable. The law enforcement conduct here stops
far short of violating that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,'
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 431-32.
146. "Respondent also urges, as an alternative to his constitutional argument, that
we broaden the nonconstitutional defense of entrapment in order to sustain the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. The Court's opinions in Sorrells v. United States, [287 U.S. 435
(1932)1, and Sherman v. United States, [356 U.S. 369 (1958)], held that the principal
element in the defense of entrapment was the defendant's predisposition to commit the
crime. Respondent conceded in the Court of Appeals, as well he might, 'that he may have
harbored a predisposition to commit the charged offenses.' 459 F.2d at 672. Yet he argues
that the jury's refusal to find entrapment under the charge submitted to it by the trial
court should be overturned and the views of,Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, concurring
in Sorrells and Sherman, respectively, which make the essential element of the defense
turn on the type and degree of governmental conduct, be adopted as the law. We decline
to overrule these cases. Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has already been once
re-examined in Sherman and implicitly there reaffirmed. Since the defense is not of a
constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question and adopt any
substantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable." Id. at 432-33.
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IV.

A.

PROCEDURE

Due Process

In Cool v. United States,'47 the Supreme Court found a denial
of due process in an instruction to the jury to ignore defense
testimony unless it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the
testimony was true. The Court saw the instruction as substantially reducing the burden of proof for the government.'" In
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,4" the Court held that due process required
a preliminary and final hearing prior to revocation of probation.
B.

Arrest

Events occurring during a temporary detention may raise the
level of suspicion to probable cause, thereby justifying an arrest.
5 0 the petitioner, a sixty-nineIn Norwell v. City of Cincinnati,'
year-old employee of a liquor store, left the premises on foot after
closing at 10:30 on Christmas night. An officer, who had been told
there was a "suspicious man" in the neighborhood, approached
him and asked if he lived in the area. The petitioner ignored the
officer, turned around and walked away. Twice the officer attempted to stop him, but on each occasion, the petitioner threw
off his arm and said, "I don't tell you people anything." The
officer thereupon arrested him for disorderly conduct and, according to his testimony, had to "push the man approximately
half a block to get him into the police car. He didn't understand
why he was being arrested."'' 51 The conviction for disorderly conduct was reversed by the Supreme Court.
[Tihe petitioner was arrested and convicted merely because he
verbally and negatively protested Officer Johnson's treatment of
him. Surely, one is not to be punished for nonprovocatively
voicing his objection to what he obviously felt was a highly
questionable detention by a police officer. 152
If officers have probable cause to make an arrest, it is imma147. 409 U.S. 100 (1972).
148. "By creating an artificial barrier to the consideration of relevant defense testimony putatively credible by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge reduced the
level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden." Id. at 104.
149. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
150. 414 U.S. 14 (1973).
151. Id. at 15.
152. Id. at 16.
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terial that the arrest was made for the wrong offense. 53 Frequently, complaint is made regarding the time lag between the
presence of probable cause and the consummation of the arrest.
In Hoffa v. United States, 54 the Supreme Court held that there
is no constitutional right to be arrested. Nevertheless, as the Tennessee court recognized in Halquist v. State,'55 constitutional
rights of the accused may be violated "if the delay results in
prejudice to him or was part of a deliberate, purposeful and oppressive design for delay."'"', In contested situations the accused
carries the burden of proving the delay was unreasonable and
prejudicial.' 7 And it should be noted that "[a] valid reason for
such a reasonable delay is the legitimate governmental interest
in keeping the identity of its undercover agents secret for a rea' 58
sonable time.'
While an illegal arrest is a violation of the fourth amendment, 5 ' standing alone it does not constitute reversible error.,"
The fruits of an illegal arrest, such as a confession, are inadmissible as evidence, 6 ' unless the relationship between the arrest
and confession is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the
illegality.161
C.

Search and Seizure

1. Search Warrants
An affidavit for a search warrant must allege facts with sufficient particularity to enable the magistrate to make an independent determination of the presence of probable cause. 6 3 Conclu153. United States v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Ramirez v.
Rodriguez, 467 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1972); People v. Clark, 30 Cal. App. 3d 549, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 147 (1973).
154. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
155. 489 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
156. Id. at 93.
157. Id.
158. Id. See also United States v. Mahoney, 355 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1973); Neal
v. State, 506 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1973).
159. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480 (1958).
160. State v. Manning, 490 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1973); Graves v. State, 489 S.W.2d
74 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
161. Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1973).
162. United States v. Cassity, 471 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
947 (1973 (incriminating statement made twenty-six days after illegal arrest).
163. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964).
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sory statements of the affiant are insufficient because they effectively usurp the judicial function.' 4 The mere association of the
suspect with "known traffickers in narcotics" is insufficient in
itself to establish probable cause for a search.6 5 The identity
of an informant need not be divulged to the accused when the
question of probable cause is in issue.' 6 The scope of the search
authorized by the warrant should be coextensive with the proba67
ble cause contained in the affidavit.
2.

Incident to Arrest

For the search incident to arrest exception to apply, it is not
always essential that an arrest actually occur. In Cupp v.
Murphy,'6 8 following the murder of his wife, the respondent went
to the police station on his own initiative for questioning. While
he was at the station, police observed a dark spot on his finger
which they thought might be dried blood. The respondent refused
a request to take a scraping from under his fingernail, whereupon
the sample was taken over his protest. The sample contained
traces of skin and blood. After the sample was taken, the respondent was allowed to leave and was not formally arrested for another
month. The scrapings ultimately formed a portion of the evidence
used to convict him of second degree murder. The Supreme Court
found, as had the lower courts, that at the time the scrapings were
taken the police had probable cause to arrest. Therefore, the
search was justifiable as incident to an arrest'6 9 and the fact that
there had been no immediate arrest was immaterial. The Court
took special note of the "ready destructibility of the evidence. ' "
Courts continue to grapple with the permissible scope of a
search incident to an arrest in light of Chimel v. California.'" In
164.

See Flanagan v. Rose, 478 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hatcher,

473 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1973); Earls v. State, 496 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1973).
165. United States v. Hatcher, 473 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1973).
166. United States v. Willis, 473 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973).

167. United States v. Combs, 468 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1972) (warrant to search for
large quantity of firearms was properly extended to the house, out buildings, vehicles and
any and all adjacent properties).
168. 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
169. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
170. 412 U.S. at 296.
171.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

United States v. Becker, 7 ' the propriety of a search of a closed
drawer in a desk three to five feet from the arrestee was sustained.
A cigar box under the mattress of a bed on which an arrestee was
lying was held properly searched in Rhineheimer v. State.'7 '
However, in Griffin v. Hudson,'74 the court found that the search
of a locked safe incident to an arrest was unreasonable under the
Chimel standard. Similarly, a search of the clothing of the arrestee some ten hours after the consummation of an arrest was found
unreasonable in United States v. Edwards.'75
3.

Plain View

An officer may seize incriminating evidence which comes
within plain view when he is in a place in which he has a right to
be. 7" And plain view may be enhanced by the use of a flashlight. " An increasing number of courts are paying deference to a
plurality view in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,'7 submitting that
the plain view doctrine can only be relied upon where the discovery of the evidence is inadvertent. 7 The doctrine requires that
the seizable item be literally in plain view. Thus, the fact that
an innocuous brown paper bag is in plain view does not render
permissible a search within the bag.1 °
4.

Exigent Circumstances

The requirement of a warrant may be dispensed with when
172. 485 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1973). "[Tihe situation was not completely under control,
since the appellant was still resisting and trying to move in directions other than those
prescribed by the officers. He had not been handcuffed or bound when the pills were
discovered and the officer who opened the drawer stated that his purpose was to secure
the desk to make sure there were no weapons." Id. at 55.
173. 487 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
174. 475 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1973).
175. 474 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974) [Eds.].
176. Armour v. Totty, 486 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1972).
177. Id.
178. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
179. Lewis v. Cardwell, 476 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1973). "[Wlhen law enforcement
offficers have prior knowledge amounting to probable cause establishing the nexus between
the article sought and the place of seizure a warrant must be obtained in order to protect
the fourth amendment principle that warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable in the
absence of exigent circumstances." Id. at 470.
180. United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973). See also United States v.
Gray, 484 F.2d 352, 356 (6th Cir. 1973). "Since the rifles were not incriminating evidence
at the time Trooper Brodt removed them from the closet and copied down the serial
numbers, this police action cannot be sanctioned under the plain view doctrine."
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exigent circumstances justify an immediate search.' Such a situ5 2 where
ation was presented in United States v. Dunavan,
passers-by found defendant in a disabled automobile, "foaming
at the mouth and unable to talk."'' 1 They removed him from the
vehicle and then went through it for identification, thereby discovering a social security card, a sizeable amount of cash, a motel
key, a car rental agreement and two locked brief cases. All these
items were turned over to a deputy sheriff who, after having defendant taken to a hospital, proceeded to the motel. Keys to one
of the brief cases were found and it was opened, ostensibly in
search of information which might have been useful to the hospital. The brief case was filled with money which was identifiable
as stolen. In light of a factual determination that defendant was
still unconscious at the time the briefcase was opened, the court
sustained the search as reasonably related to "a legitimate lifesaving purpose."'' 4
The recent occurrence of a fire was held in United States v.
Gargottol" to provide the exigent circumstances for a search by
an arson investigator and a police officer.'
5. Consent
What constitutes effective consent to search received expansive treatment by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.17 The accused was one of six individuals riding in
an automobile which was stopped because of equipment violations. An officer requested permission to search the vehicle, and
one of the occupants replied, "Sure, go ahead." There was apparently no opposition from any of the parties. Under the rear seat
the officer found three stolen checks, for the possession of which
181. See also 1972 Survey at 589-90; 1971 Survey at 265-66.
182. 485 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1973).
183. Id. at 202.
184. Id. at 204. The court was unconcerned with the search of the second briefcase,
which also contained stolen money, and which was not searched until after defendant was
conscious. The apparent explanation for this is that the contraband found in the second
briefcase was cumulative evidence, and therefore assuming the search was illegal, the error
was harmless if the search of the first briefcase was valid.
185. 476 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1973).
186. See also United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1973); Steigler v.
Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Del. 1973); People v. Connolly, 303 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. 1973);
People v. Tyler, 213 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. App. 1973).
187. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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the accused was convicted. Upon a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the federal court of appeals on appeal held that consent
was not effective unless the party understood that it could be
withheld. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Eschewing a Miranda waiver approach, the Court said that the
issue of voluntariness is one of fact, " in respect to which knowledge of the right to refuse was a factor to be considered.' The
requirement of a "knowing and intelligent waiver," the Court
reasoned, was only applicable to trial rights and pre-trial stages
where rights were designed "to protect the fairness of the trial
itself. . . .The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a
wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with
promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial."',"
The Miranda standard was further distinguished by the absence
of the factor of custody. In this regard the Court left open the
possibility that a different result might be reached were the accused in custody at the time consent was sought.''
In McCravy v. Moore,"2 the Court held that the wife of the
accused could effectively consent to a search of the jointly occupied premises. The power was in no way diminished by the fact
that the couple were experiencing marital difficulties at the time
of the consent.':t
6.

Vehicles

Courts continue to adhere to the principle that, given probable cause to believe that seizable items will be found, a warrant
is not required for the search of a vehicle.'94 Even without probable cause, however, a warrantless search of a vehicle may be
188. "ITIhe question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances." !d. at 227. See also Earls v. State, 496 S.W.2d
464 (Tenn. 1973).
189. The government need not establish such knowledge as the sine quo non of an
effective consent. 412 U.S. at 234.
190. Id. at 242.
191. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented. See also United States v.
Luton, 486 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1973).
192. 476 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1973).
193. Id. at 283.
194. United States v. Averitt, 477 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Sprouse, 472 F.2d 1167 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Preston, 468 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir.
1972); McGregor v. State, 491 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
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permissible where officers have legitimately gained custody of the
vehicle.' 5 The formality of the custody requirement was substantially relaxed by the Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski,""
where the accused, a policeman by occupation, was involved in
an automobile accident and was found to be in a state of intoxication by the investigating officers. The police expected him to have
a service revolver in his possession, but none was found on his
person or in the interior of the vehicle. After the accused had been
arrested for drunken driving and the vehicle towed to a privately
owned service station, an officer returned to the vehicle to search
further for the service revolver. In the process of this search, various evidentiary items were discovered which were later used to
convict the accused of first degree murder.
The Court held the search reasonable, noting two significant
factual characteristics. First, the police had exercised "a form of
custody or control" over the vehicle. Because the presence of the
vehicle on the highway constituted a nuisance, it was important
that it be removed as quickly as possible, and the accused was in
no condition to make the arrangements himself. Second, the belief that a weapon might be contained in the vehicle was reasonable, and a search for its recovery was justified "to protect the
public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands."' 97 The fact that the vehicle
was not in the immediate custody of the police afforded additional support for the search."'8y
D. Bail
The Tennessee statute providing for admission to bail"' was
replaced by the legislature with a far more detailed statute."
195. See Barker v. Johnson, 484 F.2d 941 (6th Cir. 1973), applying the rationale of
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
196. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
197. Id. at 443.
198. "The police did not have actual, physical custody of the vehicle as in Harris
and Cooper, but the vehicle had been towed there at the officers' directions. These officers
in a rural area were simply reacting to the effects of an accident-one of the recurring
practical situations that results from the operation of motor vehicles and with which local
police officers must deal every day." Id. at 446.
199. TENN. ConE ANN. § 40-1202 (1955) previously read: "When the defendant has
been held to answer for any bailable offense, he may be admitted to bail by the committing magistrate, or by any judge of the circuit or criminal courts."
200. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1202 (Supp. 1973).
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Under the new act, a defendant may be admitted to bail by a
committing magistrate, a judge of the circuit or criminal court, a
county judge, or by the clerk of any circuit or criminal court. Bail
authority is vested in the clerk of a court only when the judge is
not present and the clerk reasonably believes that he will not be
present within three hours. When bail is set by the clerk, defendant must be given notice of his right to petition the judge of the
court if he believes the bail is excessive. The statute further provides maximum limits on the amount of bail when set by a clerk:
$1,000 for a misdemeanor; $10,000 for a felony not involving a
crime against a person; $50,000 for a felony involving a crime
committed against a person; $100,000 for homicide.
E.

Indictment by Grand Jury

In Shadden v. State,"" the court of criminal appeals held
that the absence of persons between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one in the pool of prospective jurors did not result in
constitutionally impermissible discrimination. To establish such
a violation, the court held that defendant must first "prove that
the group of persons allegedly excluded constitute a distinct and
separate class. .
,,"Il Second, "[ilf such a discrete and cognizable class is shown, then the defendant has the further burden of
proving that members of this class were purposefully and systematically excluded. . . .",1:1 As defendant could not meet the first
requirement, the possibility of systematic exclusion was immaterial. 214
F.

Speedy Trial

Once it is determined that an accused has been denied a
speedy trial, the only effective remedy is dismissal of the
charges2 " In Strunk v. United States,2 0 the Supreme Court noted
201. 488 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
202. Id. at 60. "This record is barren of any evidence and we cannot assume that
the attitudes and propensities and predilections and viewpoints of persons in this age
group are peculiar to them and are any different than, say, those of persons in the age
group of 21-25, nor that those in the younger bracket are endowed with any greater
capacity for perceptiveness and discernment and impartiality." Id. at 59.
203. Id. at 60. The court cited Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
204. See also Hopkins v. State, 311 A.2d 483 (Md. App. 1973).
205. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973); State v. Bishop 493 S.W.2d 81
(Tenn. 1973).
206. 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
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that unintentional delays resulting from overcrowded courts or
understaffed prosecutors are "weighed less heavily" than intentional delays.
In State v. Bishop,2 7 defendant, while serving a federal sentence in Atlanta, requested that Tennessee officials bring him to
trial promptly. The supreme court held that the state was under
a duty to make a good faith effort to bring defendant to trial,2""
and "[tihe lack of financial resources for this purpose on the part
of the State of Tennessee is not a legally justifiable reason to deny
defendant his constitutional right to a speedy trial." The court
concluded, however, that defendant had not been critically prejudiced by the delay of a little over two years. It further held that
the strength of the case for the prosecution may be considered in
2
deciding whether defendant had been prejudiced by the delay. 1"
G.

Guilty Plea

In Tollett v. Henderson,"' the Supreme Court held that an
objection to discrimination in the selection of the grand jury was
22
waived by a plea of guilty.
H.

Compulsory Process

The right to compulsory process of witnesses, secured to the
accused by the sixth amendment, 211 may not be frustrated by the
trial court. In Webb v. Texas,214 before the only witness for the
defense was permitted to testify, the trial judge severely admonished her regarding the penalty for perjury.215 As a result, the
493 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. 1973).
See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
Sec gencrally ,J. COOK, CONSTITIrriONAl. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-PRETRIAl, RIGHTS § 101,
at 514 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRETRIAl. RIGHTS].
209. 493 S.W.2d at. 84.
210. Id. at 85.
211. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
212. "IRlespondent must not only establish the unconstitutional discrimination in
selection of grand jurors, he must also establish that his attorney's advice to plead guilty
without having made inquiry into the composition of the grand jury rendered that advice
outside the 'range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' " Id. at 268.
213. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
214. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
215. "'If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally
see that your case goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the
liklihood Isicl is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked
onto what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your mind
207.
208.
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witness refused to testify. The Supreme Court held that "the
judge's threatening remarks, directed alone at the single witness
for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand, and
thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law. .. ."2I Similarly, in Cool v. United States,"' the Court found it improper to
instruct the jury to disregard the testimony of a defense witness
unless they were "convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt"
because it impermissibly obstructed the right to compulsory process. Nevertheless, the right to compulsory process is to a degree
within the discretionary power of the trial court, and no error will
be found where the testimony sought would be "incompetent and
irrelevant."""
Closely related to the matter of compulsory process is the
question whether the prosecution may be compelled to reveal the
identity of a party who has played a major role in the investigation and preparation of the case, thereby enabling the accused to
call the party as a witness if he wishes. In Roviaro v. United
States,2 " the Court held that "[wihere the disclosure of the informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential
to a fair determination of a cause,""22 the privilege of secrecy must
give way. This issue arose in Roberts v. State,2 ' where the accused was charged with selling marijuana, and during crossexamination an undercover agent declined to identify the person
who he claimed was with him when the sale was made. The court
of criminal appeals determined that the testimony of the unidentified party might well be critical to the defense,1 2 and under the
on. If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years and
at least more time that you are going to have to serve. It will also be held against you in
the penitentiary when you're up for parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly understand the chances you're taking by getting on that witness stand under oath. You may
tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble.
The court wants you to know that. You don't owe anybody anything to testify and it must
be done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know the
hazards you are taking.' " Id. at 96.
216. Id. at 98.
217. 409 U.S. 100 (1972). See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973),
di.scussed in notes 232 and 233 infra.
218. Conte v. Cardwell, 475 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1972).
219. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
220. Id. at 60-61.
221. 489 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
222. "Only he can corroborate the truth of agent Whitlatch's assertion that the
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circumstances the accused had been denied his statutory right 2"
to compulsory process of witnesses in his favor. It declared:
If the State introduces proof that there was a witness to the
crime that might be in a position to assist the defense in countering the accusation but refuses to disclose his identity, then
the defendant is effectively
deprived of the important right to
22 4
have his witnesses.

L

Right of Confrontation
1.

Presence at Trial

The most fundamental aspect of the sixth amendment right
of confrontation is the right of the accused to be present at his
trial. The accused may waive the right, 225 however, a possibility
which came before the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United
States.22" On the first day of his trial on a narcotics charge, the
petitioner failed to return to the courtroom following the lunch
recess. The trial judge recessed the case until the next day, at
which time the petitioner still did not appear. A motion for a
mistrial by defense counsel was denied,"' and the judge ordered
the trial continued in the absence of the petitioner, relying upon
a provision of the federal rules.22" The Supreme Court found that
defendant sold him the marijuana and dispute the testimony of the defendant and his
sister-in-law which, if true, would force the recognition that the primary witness was either
not telling the truth or perhaps was mistaken in the identification of the isolated location
of the home of the defendant and had mistaken him for the actual person from whom the
marijuana was purchased. If the agent was not testifying truthfully, as the defendant
contends, then in all probability there was no third party witness to the crime since the
defendant committed no crime. On the other hand, if the crime occurred as the jury found
that it did, and we must here assume that they found the facts correctly, then the missing
witness, who had already revealed himself to the defendant and his family according to
the State, would have undoubtedly sealed the fate of the defendant and perhaps laid the
groundwork for charges of perjury against any witness found to have willfully falsified his
or her testimony." Id. at 265.
223. TENN. CooE ANN. § 40-2405 (1955).
224. 489 S.W.2d at 266.
225. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
226. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
227. Counsel "asserted that the jurors' minds would be tainted by petitioner's absence and that continuation of the trial in his absence deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him." Id.at 17-18.
228. FEo. R. CRIM. P. 43 provides inter alia:
The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the
imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecu-
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the petitioner had voluntarily absented himself from the trial,
that continuing the trial was authorized by the rule, and that the
2
rule was not unconstitutional. "
2.

Cross-Examination of Witnesses•

In Chambers v. Mississippi, 2" defendant called as a witness
an individual who had confessed to the crime with which defendant had been charged, but who had later repudiated his confession. After the prosecution elicited on cross-examination that the
confession had been retracted, defendant sought to examine further the confessant as an adverse witness. The request was denied
because of a common law rule denying a party the right to impeach his own witness. The state supreme court upheld the ruling
of the trial court, finding that the witness was not adverse to the
defendant, because "[nlowhere did he point the finger at Chambers." :" The Supreme Court held that the "voucher" rule, relied
upon by the state courts, denied the defendant the right of confrontation.2' :2 The Court further held that the prior statements of
the witness were themselves admissible in evidence and were
2:
improperly excluded. 13
tions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence
after the trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing
the trial to and including the return of the verdict.
229. "[lIt reflects the long-standing rule recognized by this Court in Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442, 445, 32 S. Ct. 250, 254, 56 L. Ed. 500 (1912)":
[Wihere the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he
voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what has been done or prevent
the completion of the trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right
to be present and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner
and with like effect as if he were present. (Citations ommitted).
414 U.S. at 18-19.
230. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
231. Id. at 292.
232. "lAls applied in this case, the 'voucher' rule's impact was doubly harmful to
Chambers' efforts to develop his defense. Not only was he precluded from cross-examining
McDonald, but, as the State conceded at oral argument, he was also restricted in the scope
of' his direct examination by the rule's corollary requirement that the party calling the
witness is bound by anything he might say. He was, therefore, effectively prevented from
exploring the circumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions and from challenging the renunciation of the written confession." Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted).
233. "The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their
reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to a close
acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred. Second, each one was corroborated by
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The Bruton rule,':" precluding the use of a confession of a codefendant which implicates another co-defendant when the confessor does not testify, 35 is frequently circumvented by a finding
of harmless error.2:" If all references to the non-confessing codefendant are excised, no violation of Bruton occurs.2 37
J.

Right to Counsel

1. Nature of the Right
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 3" affording an indigent accused the
right to appointed counsel in all cases in which incarceration
results from conviction, was given retroactive effect in Berry v.
City of Cincinnati."'
While an accused availing himself of the right to appointed
counsel is not entitled to select counsel of his choice, 4 " when
counsel is retained, the accused "should be afforded the opportunity to employ counsel of his own choice." '' When an accused,
whether affluent or impoverished, indicates a desire to waive
counsel, it is the responsibility of the trial court to determine if
he is competent to make the decision and whether it has been
made understandingly and intelligently."' A conviction obtained
at a trial at which the accused was denied the right to counsel
may not subsequently be used for purposes of impeachment.'"
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,4 4 the Supreme Court held that the
some other evidence in the case-McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, and proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and
subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions
provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may be the parameters of the
penal-interest rationale, each confession here was in a very real sense self-incriminatory
and unquestionably against interest." Id. at 300-01 (citation omitted).
234. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
235. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 493 S.W.2d 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
236. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Williams v. State, 491 S.W.2d
862 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Hodges v. State, 491 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
237. White v. State, 497 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); Taylor v. State, 493
S.W.2d 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) (dicta); Hodges v. State, 491 S.W.2d 624 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1972).
238. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See 1972 Survey at 602.
239. 414 U.S. 29 (1973).
240. See, e.g., Johnson v. Russell, 469 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).
241. United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 1973).
242. Hendon v. State, 489 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
243. Fee v. State, 497 S.W.2d 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973), citing Loper v. Beto,
405 U.S. 473 (1972).
244. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

right to counsel was not essential in all probation and parole
revocation cases, but that in some cases it would be essential to
fundamental fairness and therefore required to guarantee due
24 5

process.

2.

Proceeding Pro Se

While the position of the Supreme Court remains unclear,"
a number of lower courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 47 have found a constitutional right to defend one's self
in a criminal prosecution. In United States v. Capps,24 prior to
the beginning of his trial, defendant had requested that the court
permit his appointed counsel to withdraw in order that he might
conduct his own defense. The request was denied. On appeal
following conviction, the court reversed, recognizing a constitutional right of the accused to represent himself and further noting
that it was unnecessary to prove prejudice resulted from the denial. While, under some circumstances, the right might not be
entirely waivable,4 9 no exception was shown in the present case.
K.

Identification

During 1973 the Supreme Court rendered several decisions
245. "It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel is
necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements. The facts and circumstances
in preliminary and final hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being
informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request,
based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation
of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter
of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex
or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment
of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases,
whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every
case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds
for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record." Id. at 790-91.
246. See Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
247. United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1969).
248. 477 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1973) (unpublished opinion).
249. "There may be cases where a defendant may be expected to accept the assistance of counsel because of lack of intelligence, lack of familiarity with courtroom procedure or because of the possibility of deliberate disruption of the trial." Id. at 1046.
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concerning processes of identification. In Gilbert v. California,""
the Court had held that, while a courtroom identification might
have a source independent of an illegal confrontation, 5 ' evidence
of a post-indictment identification confrontation without the
benefit of counsel could not itself be introduced in evidence. In
Neil v. Biggers,25 ' the Court retreated from this principle, holding
that the out-of-court identification itself could be admitted in
evidence absent "a very substantial likelihood of. . .misidentification." 5 :' The Neil case factually predated the Wade and Gilbert
decisions and therefore was subject to analysis as a due process
case rather than a right to counsel case. 54' Thus, post-Gilbert
cases may still apply a strict rule of inadmissibility to the outof-court identification. Yet, the Neil standard will likely apply in
all cases where formal charges have not been brought against the
accused at the time of the identification, thus rendering Wade
inapplicable .155 Identification occurring shortly after the perpe5
tration of the offense is frequently held admissible. 1
Previously, in Simmons v. United States, ' the use of a photographic identification of the accused was sustained although
the case involved a pre-indictment identification, and therefore
the future application of the Wade rationale was not foreclosed.
Undue suggestiveness might still be found in a particular case. '
Indeed, a number of lower courts had found a right to counsel in
250. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
251. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
252. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
253. Id. at 198. The phrase comes from Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
384 (1968), with the deletion of the word "irreparable."
The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of unnecessarily suggestive confrontations would be to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure where
a more reliable one may be available, not because in every instance the admission of evidence of such a confrontation offends due process . . . .Such a rule
would have no place in the present case, since both the confrontation and the
trial preceded Stovall v. Denno . . .when we first gave notice that the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to be
argued to the jury.
Id. at 199.
254. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
255. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
256. Hastings v. Cardwell, 480 F.2d 1202 (6th Cir. 1973); Russell v. State, 489
S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Bracken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1972).
257. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
258. Workman v. Cardwell, 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972).
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such circumstances, 25 9 particularly when the accused was in custody at the time of the identification.2 111 However, when the Supreme Court finally confronted the issue in United States v.
Ash, 26' it concluded that the right to counsel did not apply. 262
and United States v. Mara,2 64
In United States v. Dionisio21:1
the Supreme Court sustained the power of a grand jury to compel
the production of voice exemplars and handwriting exemplars,
respectively, for purposes of identification.
L.
1.

Self-Incrimination

Comments of Prosecutor

It is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination for
the prosecutor to comment on the failure of the accused to testify. 115 However, the prosecution is not precluded from observing
in closing argument that its case is uncontradicted.2 It is also
permissible for the prosecutor to comment on the failure of the
defense to call witnesses,6 7 although this may not be deviously
employed to comment indirectly on failure of the accused to tes29
tify.
259.

See United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1972), revd, 413 U.S. 300

(1973); People v. Cotton, 197 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. App. 1972).
260. See United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970); Bajer v. State, 124
Ga. App. 334, 183 S.E.2d 622 (1971); State v. Williams, 257 S.C. 265, 185 S.E.2d 529
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 916 (1972).
261. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
262. "Even if we were willing to view the counsel guarantee in broad terms as a
generalized protection of the adversary process, we would be unwilling to go so far as to
extend the right to a portion of the prosecutor's trial-preparation interviews with witnesses. Although photography is relatively new, the interviewing of witnesses before trial
is a procedure that predates the Sixth Amendment. In England in the 16th and 17th
centuries counsel regularly interviewed witnesses before trial. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENcISH LAW 226-28 (1926). The traditional counterbalance in the American adversary

system for these interviews arises from the equal ability of defense counsel to seek and
interview witnesses himself." Id. at 317-18.
263. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
264. 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
265. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
266. Holder v. State, 490 S.W.2d 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
267. McCracken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
268. "We do not wish to be understood to say that an argument literally restricted
to a comment on failure to produce other witnesses always will avoid comment on failure
of the accused himself to testify. Such an argument may be and unfortunately sometimes
is a vehicle used by the State to get over to the jury by indirection and inference that the
accused is guilty because he has not testified. The argument is particularly suspect when
it contains a reference to the accused's common law presumption of innocence as his only
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2.

Multiple Charges

When an accused elects to waive his privilege against selfincrimination and testifies, he is subject to cross-examination to
the same extent as any other witness.2 9 This may be particularly
troublesome when the accused is charged with more than one
count in a single indictment, and he would like to controvert by
his own testimony fewer than all the charges. Courts have frequently held that the dilemma thus facing the accused does not
infringe on the privilege against self-incrimination.2 0 In Conte v.
Cardwell,27 ' the trial court took the extraordinary move of permitting the accused to testify regarding one count and rely upon the
appellate court
privilege as to another, an advantage that the
22
noted it "was not legally impelled to grant.
3.

Inference of Guilt

In Barnes v. United States,23 the Supreme Court reaffirmed27 4 the constitutionality of an inference from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property that the party knew
the property to be stolen."
4.

Documents

Because the privilege against self-incrimination is a personal
right, "individuals, when acting as representatives of a collective
group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights and
duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges. '276 A
witness. The comment never should be allowed as a part of the argument that the State's
proof is unrefuted or otherwise because it borders so perilously on the proscribed area.
Even in a case such as this where the evidence of guilt is clearly made out we would not
hesitate to reverse and remand if we thought an argument, however subtle and indirect,
told the jury it could infer the accused was guilty because he did not take the witness
stand." Id. at 51.
269. Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
270. Kirk v. United States, 457 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lee, 428
F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970).
271. 475 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1972).
272. Id. at 700.
273. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
274. See also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Yee Hem v. United
States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
275. See also Brown v. State, 489 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); 1971 Survey
at 278-79.
276. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). See also United States v.
Peter, 479 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1973).
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difficult question is presented where material that falls within the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination has been
entrusted to another by the accused. In Couch v. United States,2"
in the process of an investigation of the tax liability of the accused, a summons was directed to her accountant to produce
relevant documents. The Court reiterated the general principle
that the privilege was personal to the accused and concluded that
possession, not simply ownership, of the material in question
would be required in order to assert the privilege.27 The Court
conceded that "situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon
'
the accused substantially intact,"2 79
but here such was not the

case. 291)

M.

Confessions

1. Reassertion of Miranda Rights
The fact that an accused waives his Miranda211 rights and
responds to questions does not preclude a reassertion of the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to consult with counsel
at any time. 2 2 Just as it is improper to introduce evidence that
the accused stood silent in the face of accusation, 283 it is equally
improper to introduce evidence of the reassertion of rights.2 4 It is
not, however, necessary that the accused be advised of his right
28 5
to reassert his rights.
277.

409 U.S. 322 (1973).

278. "To tie the privilege against self-incrimination to a concept of ownership would
he to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that the business records which petitioner actually owned would be protected in the hands of her accountant, while business
information communicated to her accountant by letter, conversations in which the accountant took notes, in addition to the accountant's own workpapers and photocopies of

petitioner's records, would not be subject to a claim of privilege since title rested in the
accountant." Id. at 331.

279.
280.

Id. at 333.
See also United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971).

281.
282.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
Mock v. Rose, 472 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973);

Mays v. State, 495 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Russell v. State, 489 S.W.2d 535
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
283. 384 U.S. at 469 n.38.

284.

Mays v. State, 495 S.W.2d 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).

285.

Mock v. Rose, 472 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1973);

Russell v. State, 489 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
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N.

Jurisdiction

Normally, once punishment for an offense has been served,
the legality of the judgment becomes moot and therefore will not
be entertained by a court. However, if significant collateral consequences spring from a conviction, a discharge upon completion of
sentence does not prevent further review." In Holt v. State,87 the
court of criminal appeals concluded that such was the case when
the conviction might subsequently be employed for sentence enhancement under the habitual criminal statute. 8 '
0.

Venue

Tennessee,2"

By statute in
a criminal charge is to be tried in
the county in which the offense occurred.1 In Daniel v. State,29 '
the accused was convicted of receiving stolen property, the property being located in Bradley County. The only evidence connecting the accused with the offense was his fingerprint found on one
of the stolen items and the fact that he was observed riding in an
automobile in the county subsequent to the theft. The court held
that "[tihis total lack of essential proof that the defendant committed the crime charged in Bradley County. . .means. . . that
venue was not established."'29 2 More persuasive was the view of
Judge Russell in dissent who submitted that the court misconceived the issue as one of venue. Rather, there was no question
that the stolen property had been concealed in Bradley County,
thus establishing proper venue in that county; the real concern
of the majority was with whether there was sufficient proof of
perpetration of the offense by the accused.

In Wardius v.

P.

Fair Trial

1.

Discovery

Oregon,9 3

the Supreme Court acknowledged

See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
489 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
TFNN. CODE ANN. § 40-2801 et seq. (1955).
289. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-104 (1955).
290. Prior decisions have firmly established that venue is considered a matter of
jurisdiction in Tennessee. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 213 Tenn. 608, 376 S.W.2d 497 (1964).
291. 489 S.W.2d 852 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
292. Id. at 854.
293. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
286.
287.
288.
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the propriety of a state statute requiring the accused to give notice of an intention to use an alibi defense, 94 but held that "reciprocal discovery rights" must be afforded the accused. 95 In Graves
v. State,9 "' the court of criminal appeals held that a district attorney general lacked authority to compel witnesses by subpoena to
come before him and supply information regarding criminal matters." 7
2.

Requiring Accused to Testify First

The Tennessee statute requiring the accused to testify first
or not at all for the defense was declared unconstitutional in
Brooks v. Tennessee. "' The holding, however, has been denied
retroactive application by Tennessee courts "to cases where the
accused either testified or where he failed to testify, and, in fact,
made no attempt to do so after other defense witnesses had appeared.''299 No decision has been reached on retroactivity for cases
' 30
in which "the precise Brooks factual situation is present. 0
Q.

Trial by Jury

3 0' the Supreme
In Ham v. South Carolina,
Court held that
where the issue is properly raised, it is the responsibility of the
trial court to examine potential jurors for racial bias. At the same
time, however, the Court found no error in the failure of the trial
judge, pursuant to the request from the accused, to examine the
potential jurors as to their prejudice against persons with
beards."02 The fact that one potential juror is excused because of

294. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
295. "[11n the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The state may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for
truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy
for its own witnesses." 412 U.S. at 475.
296. 489 S.W.2d 74 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
297. "However, utilizing apparent police powers the attorney general does not possess with the cooperation of the sheriff to do that which a defendant in a suspected crime
may not do smacks of official oppression which should not be tolerated, and it is strongly
urged that the practice be abandoned." Id. at 81.
298. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
299. Franklin v. State, 496 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tenn. 1973). See also Sneed v. State,
498 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); Robbins v. State, 496 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1972); Gunn v. State, 487 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
300. 496 S.W.2d at 886.
301. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
302. "The inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its constitutional stature from the
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the divulgence during voir dire of his preconceived opinion of
guilt of the accused was held in Graves v. State3"" not to serve to
disqualify other jurors "unless it appears that the expression so
influenced them that they shared the preconceived opinion. 31 "
The use of the so-called "Allen ' 30 5 charge came before the
Sixth Circuit in Jones v. Norvell.10 Upon learning that the jury
was split eleven to one on its verdict, the trial judge instructed:
[lit is your duty to reach a verdict if you can possibly do
so-you 12 people are the only ones that can do it. The Court
it, nor anyone else. You twelve people are the only
can't : 0do
7
ones. ;
After ascertaining that the split was in favor of guilt, he sent them
back out to "see if you can make any progress." Within five
minutes the jury returned with the verdict of guilty. The court of
appeals found that there had been an improper invasion of jury
secrecy, 3 s and a coercive charge"0 9 underscored by the quick return of the verdict following the charge. 10 As a result, it concluded that the accused had been denied a fair and impartial jury
trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
firmly established precedent of Aldridge and the numerous state cases upon which it
relied, and from a principle purpose as well as from the language of those who adopted
the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial judge's refusal to inquire as to particular bias
against beards, after his inquiries as to bias in general, does not reach the level of a
constitutional violation." Id. at 528. Cf. Justice Douglas, dissenting on the issue, said:
The prejudices invoked by the mere sight of non-conventional hair growth are
deeply felt. Hair growth is symbolic to many of rebellion against traditional
society and disapproval of the way the current power structure handles social
problems. Taken as an affirmative declaration of an individual's commitment
to a change in social values, non-conventional hair growth may become a very
real personal threat to those who support the status quo. For those people nonconventional hair growth symbolizes an undesirable life-style characterized by
unreliability, dishonesty, lack of moral values, communal ('communist') tendencies, and the assumption of drug use. If the defendant, especially one being
prosecuted for the illegal use of drugs, is not allowed even to make the most
minimal inquiry to expose such prejudices, can it be expected that he will
receive a fair trial?
Id. at 530.
303. 489 S.W.2d 74 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
304. Id. at 81.
305. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
306. 472 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1973).
307. Id.
308. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 466
(1965); Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926).
309. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
310. United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961).
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In the wake of Furman v. Georgia," ' declaring the death
penalty unconstitutional, a unique problem came before the Tennessee Supreme Court in Bowen v. State.3" Defendant had received the death penalty, but the sentence had been commuted
to ninety-nine years by the governor. Defendant sought a re-trial
on the question of punishment, contending that even had the
penalty not been commuted he would have been so entitled as a
result of Furman, and he might have received a more lenient
sentence. The court disagreed, finding that the conviction was
not voided and holding that the Furman decision required nothing more than that the death penalty not be enforced. 3 The
commutation in this case had occurred prior to the Furman decision. Arguably, a different result might have been reached had
the commutation been an acceptance of the inevitable, and a
concerted effort made to give the defendant the maximum allowable punishment with the least effort, rather than as a matter of
grace.
t 4 the court of criminal appeals rejected
In French v. State,"
an argument that a fifteen year sentence amounted to a life sentence because of the poor health of defendant and that it therefore
constituted cruel and unusual punishment." 5
S.
1.

Double Jeopardy

When Jeopardy Attaches

In Illinois v. Somerville,3'6 the accused had been indicted for
theft, but before any evidence had been presented, the prosecutor
311. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
312. 488 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1972).
313. "[lit cannot validly be arged [sic] that the bare fact that the prisoner might
receive a lesser sentence in the event of a jury trial, requires that his case be remanded.
These legal principles establish that the judgment of death, though subject to avoidance,
was yet valid at the time the Governor commuted it to ninety-nine years, that this
commutation became effective without the consent of the defendant, and its legal effect
was to leave the judgment as though it had first been pronounced as a judgment sentencing the defendant to ninety-nine years in the penitentiary. And, the unconstitutional part,
that of death, being removed, the judgment is valid and enforceable." Id. at 377.
314. 489 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
315. "The law in this State is that if the punishment is within the limits prescribed
by statute for the offense, it does not violate constitutional proscriptions against cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 60.
316. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
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discovered that the indictment was fatally deficient because of a
failure to allege an essential element of the offense. Under state
law, an indictment was the only means by which the charges
could be brought, and the omission in the case could not be cured
by amendment. Over the objection of defendant, the prosecution
requested and was granted a mistrial. Thereafter, defendant contended that prosecution on a new indictment would constitute
double jeopardy. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
mistrial met the "manifest necessity" requirement of its previous
decisions." 7 Were a mistrial not permissible, reasoned the Court,
the prosecution would have no alternative but to try the case on
the faulty indictment, await the inevitable reversal on appeal,
and then retry the defendant, "thus wasting time, energy, and
money for all.concerned.""3 '
In State v. Sluder,3 9 defendant had pled guilty, but before a
jury had been impaneled for the determination of punishment, as
required by statute,32 the trial judge granted the motion of the
prosecution to nolle prosequi the case. On appeal, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that a subsequent trial did not constitute
double jeopardy because jeopardy would not attach until the jury
was impaneled and sworn.
2.

Multiple Jurisdictions

32
"'
Florida,

Waller v.
barring successive prosecutions by state
and municipal governments, 322 was accorded full retroactive application in Robinson v. Neil. 3 3 The rule, however, does not bar
successive federal and state prosecution .324
317. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). Cf. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470 (1971), discussed in 1971 Survey at 286-87.
318. 410 U.S. at 469.
319. 493 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn. 1973).
320. TENN. CODF ANN. § 40-2310 (Supp. 1973).
321. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
322. See 1970 Survey at 241-42. Cf. Bray v. State, 13 CaIM. L. REP. 2313 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 15, 1973), sustaining successive convictions under state law for burglary
and municipal law for prowling.
323. 409 U.S. 959 (1973). For the resolution of the case on remand see Robinson v.
Neil, 366 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). A de novo appeal of the municipal conviction
does not erase the attachment of jeopardy. Pettyjohn v. State, 13 CRM. L. REP. 2344
(Tenn. June 4, 1973).
324. See Martin v. Rose, 481 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1973), recognizing the continued
vitality of Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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Multiple Offenses

Tennessee decisions frequently hold that multiple convictions cannot be sustained for offenses arising out of the same
transaction if the same criminal intent is required for each offense.325 However, where there are separate criminal intents, multiple convictions may result. Thus, in Ward v. State,32 defendant
and another escaped from jail, and in the process assaulted the
jailer, taking his pistol, a shotgun, and the personal belongings
of inmates, including cash. The court of criminal appeals sustained conviction of both escape and robbery. Similarly, in
Russell v. State,"7 convictions of escape, armed robbery, and
temporarily taking an automobile without the consent of the
owner were sustained.
4.

Greater Offense on Retrial

An interesting problem was raised in Solomon v. State."' At
the first trial of defendant for first degree murder, a mistrial was
declared when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A poll of
the jury at the time indicated that five jurors thought him not
guilty, six thought him guilty of involuntary manslaughter at
most, and one thought him guilty, without further explanation.
Defendant contended that he had thereby been found not guilty
of first and second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter
and argued that instructions as to these three offenses at his
subsequent trial violated the protection against double jeopardy.
The court rejected the contention, strongly implying that counsel
should have clarified the ambiguous position of the twelfth juror
before the jury was dispersed. 29 Judge Oliver, concurring,
thought it improper to poll the jury at all before a verdict was
announced; therefore, the accused should not be permitted to use
that information fortuitously obtained to make a double jeopardy
argument.:"'
325. See 1972 Survey at 614-15.
326. 486 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
327. 499 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
328. 489 S.W.2d 547 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
329. At the second trial, defendant was denied the right to call the former juror to
explain his position. The court sustained the ruling. Id.
330. Judge Galbreath dissented:
In essence the jury said: "We find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first
and second degree and are unable to agree on manslaughter." If these words had

CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY

19741

5.

Greater Sentence on Retrial

Resolving an issue that had created a split among the courts
in Tennessee,"' the Supreme Court held in Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe332 that the Pearce rule, 3 3 precluding the rendition
of a greater sentence on retrial absent exceptional circumstances,
was inapplicable to sentencing by a jury unless the jury was informed of the prior sentence or vindictiveness was shown in some
other way. The Court reasoned that the evil sought to be remedied by the Pearce holding was not the risk of a greater sentence
but the risk of a vindictive sentence, prompted by the pursuit of
appellate remedies by the accused following the previous conviction. Pearce was denied retroactive application in Michigan v.
.
Payne.33
6.

Collateral Estoppel

In Wiggins v. State,335 two defendants were jointly charged
in a two count indictment with larceny and concealing stolen
property. The jury found both not guilty on the first charge but
guilty on the second. On appeal, they contended that the only
issue of fact in the case was proof of theft, and the proof precluded
a finding that anyone other than defendants had stolen the property. Therefore, they contended, when the jury found them not
guilty of larceny, they necessarily concluded that the property
was not stolen, and thus they could not be guilty of concealing
stolen property. The court rejected the contention, quoting Justice Holmes in Dunn v. United States36 to the effect that consistency in jury verdicts is not essential.37
been literally used, would there be any doubt as to the defendant's acquittal of
murder? Frankly, I think it would be good practice for the court to make specific
inquiry in cases involving lesser included offenses when it appears the jury is
unable to reach overall agreement to ascertain if they have unanimously reached
a verdict on any of the offenses. If a jury of his peers has reached a verdict of
not guilty, this should acquit, and it is my position that a judgment of acquittal
should have been entered by way of correction of the former judgment of
mistrial.
Id. at 552-53.
331. See 1972 Survey at 615-16; 1971 Survey at 208; 1970 Survey at 245-46.
332. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
333. North Carolina v. Pearce, 398 U.S. 711 (1969).
334. 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
335. 498 S.W.2d 92 (Tenn. 1973).
336. 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
337. "The most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either
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The court probably reached the right result but for the wrong
reason. It would appear from the recitation of the facts that it was
unnecessary to accept the hypothesis of defendants that if they
were not guilty of larceny then they could not be guilty of concealing stolen property. According to the court, a customer in a beer
tavern discovered that his wallet, which he had placed on the
table after paying for his meal, was missing. The police were
summoned, and all the patrons were requested not to leave. They
announced that no one would be arrested if whoever had the
wallet would throw it on the floor. When no one did so, the police
left, but thereafter they observed defendant Woodrow leave the
tavern and secrete an object behind a gas meter which turned out
to be the missing wallet. Woodrow testified that defendant Wiggins had given her the wallet after the police had arrived, but that
she did not know what it was. Wiggins testified that he had seen
the wallet near the table at which he was seated and had picked
it up. When the owner announced that his wallet was missing,
Wiggins was afraid to return it, because he feared that the owner
and others present would assume that he had stolen it. Indeed,
the owner himself testified that after the police left, Wiggins told
him that he had the wallet and had given it to Woodrow. On the
basis of this testimony, the jury could reasonably have concluded
that defendants lacked intent to steal at the time of the taking,
a requisite for a conviction of larceny. While defendants were
correct that there was no suggestion in the record that anyone
other than they stole the property, the error in their argument was
in the assumption that concealing stolen property can only lie if
larceny occurs. Defendants might well have been vulnerable to
some theft charge other than larceny that would not require the
intent to steal at the time of the taking-wrongful appropriation
of property found, for example. '58 For this offense, the intent to
steal could have arisen subsequent to gaining possession when the
true owner was identified. If such a charge was provable, then the
wallet would still be stolen property, and a conviction for concealin the acquittal or conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does
not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal
as no more than an assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to
which they were disposed through lenity. . . .That the verdict may have been the result
of compomise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be
upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters." Id. at 393-94.
338. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4223 (1955).
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ing stolen property would be entirely appropriate. 3 Therefore,
the verdicts rendered in the present case are not inherently
inconsistent.
Nevertheless, rather than dealing with the specifics of the
contention, the court assumed that the verdicts were inconsistent, and, citing the Dunn decision, found nothing improper in
such a result.3 4 The difficulty presented by this approach is the
failure of the court to grapple with the possibility that the Dunn
decision has been implicitly overruled on constitutional grounds
by Ashe v. Swenson,3 4' wherein the Supreme Court applied the
principle of collateral estoppel to successive criminal prosecutions as a concomitant of the protection against double jeopardy.
There appears to be little judicial consideration of the applicability of Ashe to the inconsistent verdict problem, 4 and Ashe
34 3
may be limited to successive prosecutions. One commentator
has suggested that Dunn may survive by virtue of its rationale
"that a verdict is not to be impeached solely because the jury may
have compromised in defendant's favor in reaching it." '314 Whatever the outcome of this ostensible contradiction between the
assumptions of jury logicality in the Ashe case and the assumption of the efficacy of jury illogicality of the Dunn case, 345" the
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court to ignore the issue is no
solution.
339. The phrase "stolen property" encompasses more than property taken by larceny. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 159 Tenn. 297, 17 S.W.2d 913 (1929).
340. "Consistency in verdicts for multiple count indictments is unnecessary as each
count is a separate indictment. Therein lies the essential reasoning. An acquittal on one
count cannot be considered res judicata to another count even though both counts stem
from the same criminal transaction. This Court will not upset a seemingly inconsistent
verdict by speculating as to the jury's reasoning if we are satisfied that the evidence
establishes guilt of the offense upon which the conviction was returned." 498 S.W.2d at
93-94.

341. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See 1970 Survey at 243-44.
342. See Chief Judge Bazelon concurring in United States v. Fox, 433 F.2d 1235,
1239 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
343. Comment, 71 COIUM. L. REv. 321 (1971).
344. Id. at 332.
345. Professor Bickel defended the Dunn rule in that it "permits a sensible compromise between the necessity of convicting some likeable people, or defendants who have
committed a momentarily popular crime, and the tendency of juries to be reluctant to do
so." Bickel, Judge and Jury-ncosistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L.
RFv. 649, 652 (1950).

